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What Explains Changing Spreads 
on Emerging Market Debt? 
Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody 
4.1  Introduction 
The number and value of bonds issued by emerging market borrowers 
grew enormously in the course of the 1990s (table 4.1). They were a major 
source of capital for developing countries and had significant implications 
for the operation of international capital markets. The value of the bonds 
issued by developing countries rose from negligible levels in the 1980s (less 
than $3.5 billion in 1989) to $24 billion in 1992, more than $50 billion per 
year in 1993-95,  an unprecedented $102 billion in 1996, and even higher 
levels in 1997.l Equity issues, while the subject of much attention, never 
reached comparable heights. 
The market’s ability to discriminate among borrowers and to price risk 
accordingly  has  been  controversial,  to  say  the  least.  Some  observers 
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1.  A preliminary estimate for the first three quarters of  1997 is $112.7 billion, or $150 
billion at an annual rate. There is reason to anticipate a deceleration in the fourth quarter 
of 1997, of course, given the turmoil in Asian financial markets. 
107 Table 4.1  Bond Issues, Equity Issues, and Syndicated Loans to Emerging Markets (gross, US$ billions) 
First Quarter 





Europe and Central Asia 
Middle East 
Africa 
Syndicated loan commitments 
Short-term commitments 
Total 
5.6  7.2  11.9  18.0  11.2  16.4 
13.9  24.3  62.7  56.5  57.6  101.9 
7.1  12.9  28.8  18.0  23.1  47.1 
4.1  5.9  22.0  29.9  25.3  43.1 
2.  I  4.8  9.7  3.5  6.6  7.4 
0.4  0  2.5  3.0  0.7  2.6 
0.3  0.7  0.2  2.1  1.9  1.6 
50.7  42.5  43.0  55.1  74.9  79.7 
5.2  8.2  11.9  14.3  21.6  30.5 
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emphasize that the information relevant for forecasting returns is costly 
to acquire and process. Investors, in this view, price bonds on the basis 
of incomplete  knowledge of countries’ economic and financial  circum- 
stances, a practice conducive to herding and market volatility.2  Others in- 
sist that investors have powerful incentives to be informed and discrimi- 
nating. As evidence they cite the differentials that exist between yields on 
bonds issued by countries with different credit ratings and economic char- 
acteristics. 
Proponents of both views have advanced their preferred explanation for 
the decline in emerging market spreads that took place between 1995 and 
early  1997. The secondary-market  spread  between  developing  country 
sovereign bonds and high-yield U.S. corporate issues fell from 1,752 basis 
points in March 1995 to 537 basis points in December 1996.3  (The declin- 
ing spreads of stripped Brady bonds over U.S. treasury rates is shown in 
fig. 4.1  .) Advocates of the “efficiently functioning markets” view explain 
this trend by pointing to improving macroeconomic and financial funda- 
mentals  in  developing countries, which  rededicated  themselves to eco- 
nomic liberalization and structural reform and, following the Mexican cri- 
sis, redoubled  their  efforts to  put  their  fiscal, monetary,  and financial 
affairs in order. Better policies, in this view, implied reductions in the risk 
of investing in emerging market debt and justified the decline in spreads. 
Others, more skeptical of market efficiency, question whether fundamen- 
tals  improved  sufficiently to justify  the striking decline in spreads and 
suggest that investors in their exuberance may have been snapping up 
emerging market  debt in  disregard  of  historical  relationships  between 
fundamentals and yields4 
2. Calvo and Mendoza (1995) suggest that the incentive to gather costly information is a 
declining function of opportunities for portfolio diversification, so the market’s growth may 
reduce the information possessed by the individual investor about a particular country. (This 
result depends on the assumption that the cost of acquiring information about a country is 
independent of the size of the investment or that it at least involves significant fixed costs.) 
News can then disproportionately  affect the allocation  of  funds across countries  and the 
prices of particular bonds (assuming that portfolio diversification facilitates reallocation). 
Under these circumstances, one can imagine how investors might fail to raise the risk pre- 
mium on a particular bond issue to reflect a gradual deterioration in economic conditions, 
how news about this trend could lead to a jump in prices, and how information about condi- 
tions in one country could lead investors to revise their expectations about the prospects of 
others with superficially similar characteristics.  Chari and Kehoe (1997) argue that  “hot 
money” results from “frictions” in information leading to herd-like behavior of investors in 
and out of countries on the margin, that is, countries that are not obviously attractive or 
definitely “no-no’s.’’  They contrast their model with that of Calvo and Mendoza where the 
ability to diversify limits incentives for information acquisition. Chari and Kehoe argue that 
their model predicts the types of countries that will experience hot money flows whereas 
Calvo and Mendoza predict only that hot money flows will occur. Herd behavior may also 
be observed for foreign direct investment (Kinoshita and Mody 1997). 
3. Spreads continued to fall through the third week of February  1997, after which they 
reversed direction and began to fluctuate more widely. 
4. One oft-heard justification  for this view is that the Mexican rescue removed the need 
for investors to concern themselves with a potential borrower’s credit worthiness, or at least 
left them with this belief, since the package engineered by the United States and the Interna- 110  Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody 
The weight that should be attached to these interpretations is critical for 
how we  regard the post-1995 surge of portfolio capital flows to emerging 
markets and its equally sudden halt (along with a sharp rise in  spreads) 
toward the end of 1997. If increased lending and spread compression in 
the second half of 1996 and early 1997 reflected improved fundamentals 
in  the borrowing countries, then there is no reason to think  that these 
favorable trends cannot be sustained. As long as governments are richly 
rewarded for putting national policies on a firmer footing, there are few 
grounds for worrying that the trend toward policy reform will be reversed 
or that the demand for emerging market debt will dry up. But if the surge 
of capital flows and decline in spreads reflected mainly the effects of liberal 
credit conditions in the major money centers, then there was  reason to 
worry about the effects of the eventual tightening of financial market con- 
ditions in the advanced industrial countries. Even more troubling would 
be  evidence that the increased capital flows and reduced spreads of  the 
period centered on 1996 reflected an arbitrary shift in pricing behavior, in 
which case there was no reason to rule out an equally sudden shift back 
and a corresponding curtailment of flows. 
In this paper we  analyze data on about 1,300 developing-country bonds 
launched in the years 1991-97,  a period that spans the recent episode of 
heavy reliance on bonded  debt. In contrast to previous studies, we  pay 
special attention to problems of sample selection. We analyze both the is- 
sue decision of debtors and underwriters and the pricing decision of inves- 
tors. We minimize selectivity bias by treating the two decisions jointly. 
Overall, the results confirm that higher credit quality leads to a higher 
probability of issue and to lower spreads. This supports the presumption 
that the market discriminates among issuers according to risk. But  the 
same explanatory  variables have different effects in  the principal debt- 
issuing regions  (Latin America,  East  Asia,  and  Eastern  Europe). And 
when it comes to changes in spreads over time, we  find that these are ex- 
plained mainly by shifts in market sentiment rather than by shifts in funda- 
mentals. An obvious break point is the fourth quarter of  1994, when the 
Mexican crisis erupted and spreads moved sharply higher, before falling 
subsequently to lower levels than before. Comparing 1991  :Q1 to 1994:Q3 
with 1995:Ql to 1995:Q4 (the pre-  and post-  Mexican crisis subperiods), 
we  find that changes in spreads were dominated by sharp adverse shifts in 
market sentiment more than by changes in fundamentals. The same is true 
of the subsequent compression, which this time reflected favorable shifts 
in market sentiment. 
Section 4.2 of the paper begins by  reviewing the literature. Section 4.3 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) allowed them to escape the 1994-95  Mexican crisis scot-free. 
If the same “chain of guarantees” is likely to again come into play in the event of future 
debt-servicing difficulties, bondholders have little reason to invest the time and effort needed 













































































































































































































































































































 112  Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody 
describes the data and section 4.4 the issues of specification and estima- 
tion. Section 4.5 reports the basic results for both the issue decision and 
pricing behavior. Section 4.6 attempts to decompose the contributions of 
fundamentals and market sentiment to pricing behavior over time. Shifts 
in pricing behavior are also examined by comparing predicted and actual 
spreads both within the estimated sample and out of the sample. Section 
4.7 draws out the implications  of the analysis for how to think  about 
emerging market debt. 
4.2  The Literature 
Despite the explosive growth of emerging market debt, there have been 
few  systematic studies  of  the  issue  and  pricing  of  developing-country 
bonds. This is in contrast to the secondary market for bank loans, about 
which there exist a significant number of studies (reflecting the dominance 
of banking lending in the period  1974-82).5 But there is reason to think 
that the determinants of risk and therefore pricing behavior differ between 
bank loans and bonds. Models of delegated monitoring suggest that banks 
may have a comparative advantage in assembling and processing informa- 
tion about their clients and that this reputational asset may be incorpo- 
rated into the secondary market prices of their claims. Pecking-order theo- 
ries of finance suggest that claims with different degrees of seniority have 
different levels of risk and that their prices should bear a different relation- 
ship to fundamentals. Bonds typically have senior status, while the legal 
status of bank loans is more variable. Thus, the conclusions from studies of 
the market in bank loans may not carry over to the market in bonded debt. 
The few extant studies of the market for developing-country bonds are 
subject to other limitations. For instance, Cantor and Packer (1995) ana- 
lyze the determinants of spreads on sovereign bonds for forty-nine coun- 
tries in 1995, relating spreads to per capita income, gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth, inflation, the fiscal balance, the external balance, and ex- 
ternal debt, to indicators of economic development and default history, 
and to the average of Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s country credit rat- 
ings (CCRs). Limitations of this study include the fact that it considers 
developed as well as developing countries, that it analyzes only sovereign 
bonds and not also private issues, and that none of the macroeconomic 
variables is statistically significant when credit ratings are included. Cline 
(1995) limits his consideration to developing countries and includes corpo- 
rate as well as government borrowers. However, he studies only highly in- 
debted countries, whose representativeness may be questioned, and he con- 
siders only four economic determinants of interest rate spreads: inflation, 
per capita income, export growth, and GDP growth (along with dummy 
5. See Hajivassiliou (1989) and Huizinga (1989) for examples and surveys of the literature. What Explains Changing Spreads on Emerging Market Debt?  113 
variables for private issues and participation in Brady plan debt reduction 
schemes). Because his sample ends with the second quarter of  1993, he 
has only 92 bond issues, and some of his estimates are for just 68 bonds. 
Of his four economic variables, only export growth and GDP  growth differ 
significantly from zero at standard confidence levels. A follow-up study 
(Cline and Barnes  1997) uses more recent data and a somewhat longer 
list of explanatory variables but is otherwise subject to many of the same 
limitations. In addition, it uses data for selected Western European bor- 
rowers as well as emerging markets, raising questions about the homoge- 
neity of the sample. 
Eichengreen and Portes (1989) analyze a larger sample of 375 interna- 
tional bonds issued in the 1920s, the last time bond markets were a leading 
vehicle for international lending. But the fact that their sample includes 
both developing and advanced industrial countries and that the informa- 
tion and regulatory structure of the market has changed over time limits 
the relevance of this study for present purposes. Edwards (1986) analyzes 
bond spreads in 1976-80, but since there did not then exist an active mar- 
ket in developing-country debt, he has data for only thirteen countries and 
167 bonds. And it is not clear that we  should expect pricing performance 
to remain  the same over time.6 New investors have entered the market 
since the period Edwards analyzes: while banks held fully 97 percent of 
all emerging market debt at the end of the 198Os, their share had fallen to 
less than two-thirds by the mid-1990s (Bernstein and Penicook 1996). New 
issuers entered as well.’ 
Finally,  a  study  by  Kamin  and van  Kleist  (1997)  analyzes  launch 
spreads on 304 bonds (and 358 syndicated bank loans) issued in the 1990s. 
The authors relate spreads to Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s CCRs (as 
a summary measure of the macroeconomic determinants of country credit 
worthiness) and industrial country interest rates (as a measure of interna- 
tional financial conditions). They find that Latin American spreads are on 
average 39 percent higher than on otherwise comparable Asian issues, a 
result suggestive of market segmentation. Surprisingly they find that the 
coefficient on industrial country interest rates tends to be significantly neg- 
ative or insignificantly different from zero, but never positive. 
The fact that country participation in the bond market has risen over 
time suggests that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the relation- 
ship between spreads and country characteristics will suffer from selectiv- 
ity bias. The same changes in economic and financial conditions that affect 
the price of issues can also affect the decision to enter the market. Bond 
traders often remark  that a rise in U.S. treasury rates raises spreads on 
6.  As emphasized above in section 4.1. 
7. Potentially accentuating the trade-off between portfolio diversification and information 
acquisition emphasized by Calvo and Mendoza (1995). 114  Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody 
developing-country bonds less than proportionately, for example, because 
high-risk borrowers are discouraged from coming to the market. Focusing 
exclusively on the determinants of the pricing decision to the neglect of 
the impact of those same factors on the decision to enter the market may 
therefore be a source of selectivity bias. In the next sections we  employ a 
data set and methodology designed to ameliorate these problems. 
4.3  Data and Sample Characteristics 
The bonds we  study are fixed income securities with a specified matu- 
rity, face value, and coupon.* While issued by emerging market borrowers, 
they are placed on international markets and are denominated in devel- 
oped country currencies (dominantly in U.S. dollars). Although the bulk 
of this market consists of bonds placed in the Euromarkets (mainly the 
Eurodollar market), over our sample period a growing number of coun- 
tries floated bonds on the U.S. public market for foreign issuers (the Yan- 
kee market) and the U.S. private placement market (under provisions of 
Rule 144a); there was also some growth in issues denominated in deutsche 
marks and yen. The bonds are typically underwritten by a syndicate of in- 
vestment banks who commit to placing them with investors. After place- 
ment they trade on the secondary market and may be listed on an exchange. 
4.3.1 
Our data are initial offer or “launch” spreads for bonds offered between 
January 1991 and December  1997 by  fifty-five countries, obtained from 
Capital Data Bondware and further processed by  the Emerging Markets 
Division of the IMF. That they are launch spreads is important. Figure 
4.2 shows that launch spreads move differently over time than spreads on 
secondary markets. While there is some tendency for primary spreads to 
follow secondary spreads with a lag of three  of four quarters, the two 
series frequently  diverge.  In  poor  market  conditions,  when  secondary 
spreads rise, primary spreads do not rise proportionately; indeed, some- 
times they fall. This reflects the tendency for the number of issues to fall 
and for only the most credit worthy borrowers to remain in the market. In 
other words, factors that increase the risks of investing in emerging market 
debt, while raising secondary market spreads, may have the opposite effect 
on launch spreads insofar  as riskier borrowers are rationed out of the 
market, leaving only low-risk, low-spread borrowers to launch new issues. 
This makes it important to control for the likelihood of new issues by 
different classes of borrowers. 
The Bonds: Numbers, Spreads, and Issuers 
8. The share of international bond issues with convertible and floating rates did in fact 
rise slightly after 1993, but we  exclude these from the sample on the grounds that the risks 











































































































































 116  Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody 
Table 4.2  Launch Spreads, 1991-97  (basis points) 
Region  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  Average 
Africa  200  166  197  151  140  94  159 
East Asia  110  74  173  145  125  149  178  152 
Eastern Europe  226  211  222  191  269  238  332  266 
Latin America  376  448  410  369  413  390  307  384 
Middle East  17  119  216  219  196  167 
South Asia  385  190  233  174  212 
Average  338  387  356  288  289  291  265  306 
Number of bonds 
Bonds with spreads  52  118  239  163  170  302  314  1,358 
Total bonds  84  165  332  202  203  342  369  1,697 
Notes: A blank indicates that no bond was issued. A bond’s spread is estimated by  first calculating that 
bond’s yield to maturity using the market price at the time of issue and then subtracting the yield on a 
“riskless” sovereign security of comparable maturity in the currency of issue. 
Our source provides data for 1,697 bonds over the period 1991-97  (table 
4.2). The number of bonds issued grew rapidly from 84 in  1991 to 332 
in 1993 before falling to just over 200 in 1994 and 1995 (the Mexican crisis 
contributing  to poor  market  conditions  in  1995). Bond  issuance  rose 
sharply in 1996 and was set to record a banner year in 1997 before the Asian 
crisis hit. In our analysis we  were able to use just over 1,300 bonds. No 
spreads were publicly available for 339 bonds. Also, for some bond issues 
ancillary information on country conditions was incomplete. Our results 
are based on data for 1991 through 1996, for which we have 1,033 usable 
bonds. We use 277 bonds issued in 1997 for out-of-sample forecasting. 
Latin America accounts for about 60 percent of the bonds issued (1,000 
of the 1,697). The main Latin issuers were Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. 
East Asia is a distant second with 416 bonds (Korea being a leading issuer 
in that region). Eastern Europe had 180 bonds in this period, with 1997 
an especially active year for the region. 
Latin America has also had the highest spreads. Annual average spreads 
were more than 350 basis points in all the years from  1991 to 1996 and 
fell for the first time below that level to 307 basis points in 1997. In con- 
trast, East Asian spreads were always less than 200 basis points even in 
1997 when they rose to their highest level. That said, there is considerable 
variation within East Asia; the standard deviation of  spreads relative to 
the mean is typically higher for East Asia than Latin America. Eastern 
European spreads have consistently been between those of Latin America 
and East Asia. 
Table 4.3 summarizes sample characteristics  by  type of issuer. Three 
categories are distinguished: sovereign, other public, and private. The ma- 
jority of the issues are by  private borrowers, although public entities in 
East Asia have a relatively high propensity to issue bonds. Sovereign issues What Explains Changing Spreads on Emerging Market Debt?  117 




East  Eastern  Latin  Middle  South 
Africa  Asia  Europe  America  East  Asia 
Sovereign 
Bonds with spreads 
Total number of bonds 
Bonds with spreads 
Total number of bonds 
Bonds with spreads 
Total number of bonds 
Public 
Private 
166  94 
6  32 
10  38 
131  91 
5  147 
11  194 
205  226 
2  145 





































dominate in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Sovereign issues do not 
necessarily carry higher spreads than the other public issues, which partly 
reflects variations in country composition, although the regression anal- 
ysis to follow suggests other factors may also be at work. We would expect 
private issues to carry higher spreads, reflecting the benchmark status of 
public issues and private bonds’ greater perceived riskine~s.~  The averages 
for all regions except South Asia confirm this presumption, as does the 
regression analysis. 
4.3.2  Explanatory Variables 
We used a variety of macroeconomic indicators to analyze the determi- 
nants of the issue decision and the spread. As a proxy for the risk-free 
rate, we used the yield on ten-year U.S. treasury bonds (at time of issue). 
Several country characteristics were used to proxy for credit quality (for 
details, see the data appendix). Data were obtained principally from the 
World Bank’s World Debt Tables and Global Development Finance and the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics and World Economic  Outlook on 
the ratio of total external debt to gross national product (GNP), the ratio 
of debt service to exports, a dummy variable for whether a country con- 
cluded a debt restructuring agreement with either private or official credi- 
tors in the previous year, the ratio of international reserves to GNP, the 
growth rate of GDP (at constant  1990 prices, denominated in domestic 
currency), and the budget deficit as a share of GDP. 
Sovereign credit ratings were gathered from Institutional Investor. Pub- 
9. This is consistent with the procedures of bond rating agencies, which are reluctant to 
grant private borrowers higher credit ratings than sovereigns on the grounds that a sovereign 
with transfer problems will frequently interrupt the access of private domestic debtors to 
supplies of foreign exchange; see Levey (n.d.). 118  Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody 
lished each March and September, these ratings are based on a survey of 
international bankers, who assign a numerical value ranging from 0 to 100 
(with 100 indicating zero probability of default). For each observation we 
used the most recent credit rating prior to the bond's date of issue. But 
rather than include the raw  CCR, we  employ the residual from a first- 
stage regression of the credit rating on country and issuer characteristics. 
We utilize only the orthogonalized component because the credit rating is 
correlated with other issuer characteristics that are included separately as 
explanatory variables (see, e.g., Cantor and Packer 1994 and Haque et al. 
1996).'O Because a preliminary look at the data suggested different behav- 
ior on the part of issuers in Latin America and the Caribbean, we  consid- 
ered Latin American and East Asian issues separately as well as together. 
4.4  Specification and Estimation 
A standard model of spreads is a linear relationship of the form 
(1)  log(spread)  =  fX  +  u,, 
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the spread, Xis a vector 
of issue and issuer characteristics, and u, is a random error. The vector 
X  comprises bond  characteristics  (the maturity  of  the  bond,  principal 
amount, and whether it was privately placed); global economic conditions 
proxied by the ten-year rate on U.S. treasuries; country characteristics like 
the sovereign credit rating residual, the ratio of debt to GDP, the ratio of 
debt service to exports, a dummy variable if the country underwent a debt 
restructuring in the previous year, and the GDP growth rate; and issuer 
characteristics including the region of the borrower, whether the borrower 
is sovereign, other public, or private, and the currency in which the bond 
was issued. 
The conditions under which this linear equation provides an unbiased 
estimate of the relationship of issuer characteristics to spreads may not be 
met, for not all potential issuers will be in the sample at all points in time. 
10. The estimated equation was 
credit rating =  36.93  + 12.45 reserves/GNP -  6.99 debt reschedule 
(59.42)  09.04)  (-5.04) 
-  11.75 debt/GNP+ 252.96 GDP growth - 12.15 (reserveslGNP) * LAC 
+ 3.75 (debt reschedule) * LAC  -  10.28 (debt/GNP) * LAC 
-  520.89 (GDP growth) * LAC, 
R2 =  0.48,  t-statistics are in parentheses 
(- 12.82)  00.88)  (- 4.67) 
0.98)  (-5.27) 
(-7.38) What Explains Changing Spreads on Emerging Market Debt?  119 
The spread and its relationship to issue and issuer characteristics will be 
observed only when positive decisions to borrow and lend are made. We 
assume that spreads are observed when a latent variable p crosses a thresh- 
old p’ defined by: 
p’  =  gX’  +  u2, 
where X’ is the vector of variables that determines the desire of borrowers 
to borrow and willingness of lenders to lend (which we  refer to as determi- 
nants of bond supply and demand, respectively), and u2  is a second error 
term. If the error terms are bivariate normal with standard deviations s, 
and sz and covariance s:,  (where p2 = s~,/s,s,),  this is a standard sample 
selection model, a la Heckman (1979). The model can be identified by the 
nonlinearity of the fitted probabilities in the selection equation and by the 
inclusion of elements in X’  that are not also in X.” 
Estimating the probit requires information on those who did not issue 
bonds. To address this problem we  used the following approach. For each 
country we  allowed for three types of issuers: sovereign, public, and pri- 
vate. For each quarter and country where one of these issuer types did not 
come to the market, we  recorded a zero. Table 4.4 highlights the character- 
istics of issuers (is = 1) relative to non-issuers (is = 0). It suggests, plausi- 
bly,  that issues are more likely when US. interest rates are low, when the 
borrower is of better quality credit (with higher credit rating residuals and 
lower debt levels), and when reserves are low and budget deficits are larger 
(creating a public-sector demand for foreign funds). 
We  estimate equations (1) and (2) jointly using maximum likelihood. 
Implemented with the full sample, the maximum-likelihood estimates con- 
verge nicely. When performing sensitivity tests using smaller samples, the 
full maximum-likelihood estimates do not always converge; in this case we 
perform  the  conventional two-step procedure, first estimating a maxi- 
mum-likelihood probit model and then a regression using the estimated 
inverse Mills ratio  (with full-information standard errors). Where esti- 
mates are obtained using both procedures, we  find little difference in the 
results. 
4.5  Results 
The coefficients for the probit in table 4.5 are normalized to the partial 
derivative of the probability distribution function with respect to a small 
change in the independent variable evaluated at average values of the inde- 
pendent variables to facilitate interpretation of the coefficients. We report 
separate equations for the full data set and for the Latin American and 
11. Ozler and Huizinga (1992) estimate a similar model on data for the secondary-market 
prices of bank loans. Table 4.4  Descriptive Statistics of Issuers (is = 1) and Nonissuers (is = 0) 
Latin America 
All  and East Asia  Latin America  East Asia  Eastern Europe 





U.S. treasury rate 
Credit rating 
Credit rating residual 
DebtlGNP 
Dummy for debt rescheduling 
Debt servicelexports 


























319.10  384.25  152.18  265.82 
174.77  165.96  195.95  257.47 
6.71  5.81  8.88  6.32 
0.42  0.46  0.32  0.29 
6.77  6.50  6.79  6.50  6.78  6.49  6.81  6.51  6.75 
37.12  44.46  40.42  37.10  28.97  62.15  63.14  40.67  33.34 
-0.97  8.01  2.05  4.87  -2.15  16.41  11.12  2.69  -5.49 
0.43  0.34  0.45  0.36  0.54  0.27  0.26  0.43  0.28 
0.13  0.22  0.21  0.30  0.28  0.05  0.08  0.08  0.07 
0.19  0.38  0.22  0.48  0.28  0.12  0.11  0.31  0.12 
-0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  -0.05 
0.55  0.35  0.62  0.28  0.38  0.53  1.12  0.42  0.51 
-0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.02  -0.05  -0.01 
0.26  0.71  0.66  1 .oo  1  .00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.34  0.26  0.34  0.18  0.35  0.47  0.32  0.15  0.34 
0.33  0.58  0.30  0.64  0.31  0.44  0.29  0.13  0.35 
0.14  0.05  0.37  0.30 
0.05  0.06  0.03  0.22 Table 4.5  Determinants of the Probability of a Bond Issue, 1991-96 
Latin America  Latin  East  Eastern 
All  and East Asia  America  Asia  Europe 
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Caribbean  (henceforth  referred  to as Latin America),  East Asian, and 
Eastern European subsamples. 
When the U.S. treasury rate is high, the volume of new issues declines 
significantly. This finding is consistent with a “search for yield” view of 
the market-the  idea that when U.S. interest rates fall there is a greater ap- 
petite for higher-yielding emerging market bonds. This appears to be uni- 
formly the case, although the strength of the relationship varies across the 
regions. A sharp decline in issues following a rise in U.S. treasury rates is 
most evident for East Asia, suggesting the possibility that the East Asian 
issuers hold back the supply of bonds when U.S. interest rates rise and 
their borrowing costs go up.’*  The higher the credit rating residual,  the 
greater the probability of issuance in all regions except East Asia, where 
the effect is insignificant. Higher debt levels reduce the probability of issue 
especially in Latin America, For East Asia, higher debt service is associ- 
ated with lower probability  of  issue. On the  supply side, low reserves, 
higher deficits, and, for Latin America and Eastern Europe, higher debt 
service levels tend to increase bond issuance. 
Table 4.6 presents OLS estimates of  the spread equation and table 4.7 
the full model with the selectivity correction. The coefficients once again 
reveal differences in pricing across regions. For Latin America the coeffi- 
cient on the issue amount indicates plausibly that larger issues command 
smaller spreads (consistent with the existence of economies of marketing 
and distribution and the greater liquidity of larger issues on the secondary 
market). Latin American private placements enter the spreads equation 
with a positive sign, consistent with the fact that these bonds are issued in 
markets  with less stringent  disclosure requirements. Disclosure  require- 
ments for private placements are less stringent because trading in those 
bonds is  restricted  to “qualified investors,” that is, investors capable of 
managing the associated risk. Also, the bonds for this reason are less liq- 
uid. Because the private placement market is narrower and because infor- 
mation on issuer characteristics may be somewhat less complete, the pre- 
sumption is that purchasers of  bonds placed in that market will demand 
a higher spread. Latin American  issues typically having been relatively 
short term; there is little evidence of a well-defined yield curve until 1996. 
The picture is different for East Asian issuers, who had by  then placed 
several long-term issues for which they paid higher spreads. There is  a 
large negative coefficient in the spreads equation on the dummy variable 
for Israel, reflecting the fact that its issues are guaranteed by the U.S. gov- 
ernment. Supranational bonds (guaranteed by  entities beyond the coun- 
tries’ borders) also have lower spreads. 
Recent studies have found, somewhat surprisingly, a negative influence 
12. We will have more to say on the idcntification of demand and supply effects of U.S. 
interest rates below when we  consider the spread and issues decisions together. What Explains Changing Spreads on Emerging Market Debt?  123 
Table 4.6  Determinants of Spreads, 1991-96,  OLS Regressions 
Latin America  Latin  East  Eastern 
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Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics 
of the U.S. interest rate on emerging market spreads (see, e.g., Kamin and 
van Kleist  1997). The OLS results presented  in table 4.6 are consistent 
with this finding. Among the possible interpretations of the negative sign 
is  the change in composition of bonds issued when interest  rates vary. 
Since higher interest  rates are seen to reduce bond issuance (as in the 
probit above), it is possible that the bonds that do come to the market 
have some unobserved credit features that make them attractive and hence 124  Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody 
Table 4.7  Determinants of Spreads, 1991-96,  with the Selectivity Correction 
Latin America  Latin  East 






















































(  -2.55) 
-0.198 



















































































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
reduces observed spreads. If this interpretation is correct, then the nega- 
tive sign should be significantly attenuated when we correct for the selec- 
tion bias. Indeed, comparing the coefficients in tables 4.6 and 4.7, we find 
for Latin America that the negative coefficient on the U.S.  treasury rate 
turns positive and significant at the  10 percent level. This is consistent 
with the idea that selection bias plays a role in driving the observed result. What Explains Changing Spreads on Emerging Market Debt?  125 
For East Asia, in contrast, the negative coefficient on the U.S. interest 
rate persists even after correcting for selectivity. To interpret this finding, 
it is useful to consider the probit and the spreads equation together, for 
this leads to an intuitive interpretation in terms of supply and demand.13 
For Latin America, a higher interest rate reduces the probability of an is- 
sue and raises spreads (after correction for the selection bias). The implica- 
tion is that when interest rates rise, the demand for Latin American bonds 
falls and their price therefore declines (equivalently, the spread rises). For 
East Asia, in contrast, a rise in U.S. interest  rates appears to shift the 
supply curve inward, raising the price and reducing the spread. 
For other variables that appear in both the issue and spreads equations, 
it is once again useful to ask whether they work in the same or opposing 
directions. In the regressions using the full sample of bonds, a larger credit 
rating residual  (a better credit rating,  other things equal) increases the 
probability of an issue and reduces the spread, as if countries with inferior 
credit ratings find it both more difficult and costly to borrow. Similarly, 
and especially in Latin America, a higher debt to GNP ratio both reduces 
the probability  of an issue and increases the spread. In Latin America, 
debt rescheduling has a weak positive effect on the probability of an issue 
(i.e., those rescheduling debt are apt to come to the capital market quickly) 
while at the same time raising the spread that successful issuers are forced 
to pay. The dummy variable for Latin America behaves similarly: Other 
things equal, Latin American borrowers issue more bonds but pay higher 
spreads. Finally, although the magnitude and the significance of p-the 
correlation coefficient of the errors in the two equations-varies  by time 
period and sample, it is generally negative. The implication is that unob- 
served factors that cause an issue to come to the market also reduce the 
spread and should be interpreted as unobserved determinants of demand. 
In contrast, variables whose coefficients work in offsetting directions 
influence mainly the supply of bonds. For example, while countries that 
have recently rescheduled tend to have accumulated an unsatisfied appe- 
tite for borrowing and therefore supply additional new issues, the corre- 
sponding outward shift in  the supply reduces the price of their  bonds, 
increasing the spread. Similarly, the regional dummies suggest that Latin 
American countries have continent-specific characteristics, not otherwise 
quantified, that cause them to supply an unusually high volume of bonds; 
this works, other things equal, to drive down the prices of their issues and 
increase the spreads they are charged. 
13. We invoke this interpretation sparingly and with caution, for in a market with imper- 
fect information and enforcement, it is possible for the demand to bend back and for move- 
ments along that portion of the demand schedule to look like movements along a supply 
curve. (Note that we frame our discussion in terms of bond supply and bond demand, not in 
terms of credit supply and credit demand, as in textbook models of credit rationing. The dis- 
tinction is of only terminological importance, but its significance is great; it leads us to speak 
of a “backward bending demand curve” rather than a “backward bending supply curve.”) 126  Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody 
The supply and demand effects vary noticeably by  region. Note, for 
example, that the coefficients for issues denominated in yen and deutsche 
marks have significant negative signs for East Asia but not so elsewhere. 
Thus, for East Asia, it appears access to the yen-denominated markets 
(and to the deutsche mark markets) has proved an easy source of funds. 
With that source of funds available, the East Asian issuers are better able 
to time their bond issues. Another example of differential effects between 
East Asia and Latin America is the sign on p,  the correlation between the 
error terms in the spread and probit equations. For Latin America this 
term behaves much like the credit rating residual-a  low probability of 
issue is associated with a higher-than-predicted  spread. For East Asia, in 
contrast, p is positive. An interpretation is that Asian bonds with a low 
probability  of issue that come to the market anyway are not penalized 
with higher spreads. In fact, they are able to obtain lower-than-predicted 
spreads, perhaps reflecting the desire of investors, for reasons of diversifi- 
cation, to acquire East Asian bonds that are not in plentiful supply. 
4.6  Changes in Spreads over Time 
A central question in the literature on capital flows to emerging markets 
is whether changes in spreads are explicable by changes in fundamentals 
or whether there have been changes in pricing behavior over time. If  a 
better credit rating, lower debt or debt service ratios, and fewer debt re- 
structurings can explain the reductions in spreads that occurred between 
1995 and 1997, then there may be reason to be relatively sanguine about 
the market:s  pricing behavior and, for that matter, about the sustainability 
of capital flows. If, on the other hand, recent capital inflows were encour- 
aged by  a not otherwise explicable shift in pricing in favor of developing 
country debt, then there is no a priori reason to rule out a sudden and 
equally dramatic shift back and a corresponding curtailment of flows. 
4.6.1 
expressed as follows: 
The Contribution of Fundamentals and Sentiment 
The change in spreads between two periods, denoted S, -  S2, can be 
(3)  s, - s2  =  P,X, - P2X2. 
Adding and subtracting PIX, and rearranging, one obtains the familiar 
Oxaca decomposition: 
(4)  s, - s2  =  PI(T - XZ) +  X,(P, - P2). 
The first term on the right side of equation (4) is the contribution to the 
change in spreads of the change in their economic determinants (XI -  XJ; 
this can be thought of as the contribution of the change in fundamentals. What Explains Changing Spreads on Emerging Market Debt?  127 
The second term is the contribution  of the change in coefficients (p, - 
p,).  This can be thought of as the contribution of changes in market senti- 
ment-in  the way  the markets regard the credit worthiness of countries 
with given characteristics. To aid interpretation, we  further break these 
effects into subcategories. Among changes in sentiment, we distinguish the 
impact on spreads of changes in the constant term (C, -  C,),  which can 
be thought of as blanket changes in sentiment as emerging market bonds 
come into or fall out of favor, from the impact of changes in the coeffi- 
cients on the independent variables [X,(p, -  @*)I, which can be thought 
of as changes in sentiment toward countries with given macroeconomic 
characteristics  (as, for example, the issues of relatively risky borrowers 
come to be regarded as more attractive). Similarly, we distinguish changes 
in the average inverse Mills ratio (which can be thought of as a measure 
of sample selectivity) versus changes in the average value of the other vari- 
ables. Finally, we  distinguish changes in the effect of a given level of the 
inverse Mills ratio (which can be thought of as the impact on spreads of 
having in the sample an issue that our selection equation predicts should 
not be included) from changes in the effect of other regressors. Intuitively, 
a rising coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio suggests that the market is 
growing more discriminating. 
The decompositions are computed for two periods before and after the 
Mexican crisis, and before and during the 1996-97  period of spread com- 
pression (see table 4.8). Note that when the spread in the first period is 
larger than in the second (spreads are falling), a positive change in log 
spread is recorded. Launch spreads declined following the Mexican crisis; 
Table 4.8  Decomposition of the Change in Spreads 
Change in  Change in  Change in 
Fundamentals  P  's  Spread 
The Mexican Crisis  (1991:  Ql-1994: Q3 to 1995: Ql-1995: Q4) 
Bond features  0.02  0.25 
U.S. treasury rate  0.00  2.71 
Country characteristics  1.13  0.17 
Dummy variables  0.22  0.58 
Inverse Mills ratio  0.00  -0.07 
Constant  -3.83 
Total  1.37  -0.18 
Irrational Exuberance? (1995:Ql-I995:Q4  to 1997:QI-I997:Q4) 
Bond features  0.00  -0.81 
U.S. treasury rate  0.04  -6.92 
Dummy variables  -0.20  -0.24 
Country characteristics  -0.70  0.06 
Inverse Mills ratio  0.01  0.31 
Constant  8.22 
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that decline was especially sharp in  1995, when only high-quality issues 
were brought to the market. (Recall that secondary spreads skyrocketed in 
1995. That shift in sentiment against developing countries is reflected in 
issue behavior, as discussed below.) 
Consider first the period preceding the Mexican crisis (1991  :Q1-1994: 
Q3) compared to the period immediately following (  1995:QlP1995:Q4). 
While secondary market spreads rose sharply in 1995, launch spreads ac- 
tually fell, as can be seen from the first panel of table 4.8 (again, according 
to our convention,  a positive change in  spread represents  a decline in 
spreads from the first to the second period). This decline in spreads re- 
flected five broad factors. First, market sentiment moved strongly against 
emerging markets:  the constant term in the  spread equation increased 
greatly and, all else equal, would have increased primary spreads consider- 
ably (in parallel with trends in the secondary markets). Second, this poorer 
market sentiment was offset by a change in the coefficient on U.S. treasury 
rates. For given U.S. treasury rates, in other words, the market was willing 
to charge lower spreads for the issues that were brought to the market. 
Third, the fundamentals of issuers coming to the market during the post- 
crisis period were better than those of issuers in the market prior to the 
crisis. Fourth, the market seems to have taken a more benign view of fun- 
damentals immediately following the crisis. An exception to that was a 
more negative view of high debt service. Finally, there were compositional 
shifts in the issues that came to the market that lowered average spreads. 
Proportionately  fewer Latin American  issues and private  issues and  a 
greater share of yen-denominated and deutsche mark-denominated  issues 
reduced the average level of spreads observed. 
Secondiry market spreads declined in 1996 and in the first half of 1997, 
a trend that was viewed by  some as “irrational exuberance.” But though 
secondary market spreads were falling, primary spreads show a small in- 
crease. But once again, this increase is composed of offsetting factors (see 
the bottom panel of table 4.8). Overall market sentiment (as summarized 
by the constant) improves. Again, as new, less credit worthy issuers came 
to the market, this shift in market sentiment was moderated by  two off- 
setting factors: the reduced sensitivity of spreads to changes in U.S. inter- 
est rates, and a higher premium on the poorer risks entering the market. 
4.6.2  Was the Market Irrationally Exuberant in 1996 and 1997? 
The sharp decline in spreads in the second half of 1996 and continuing 
through at least the first half of 1997 led some observers to ask whether 
the market was irrationally exuberant. The decline in spreads was excep- 
tionally rapid, and an unusual number of new issuers entered the market. 
Our estimates allow us to compare these outcomes with predictions. 
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1995 and used the estimates to generate within-sample forecasts for 1995 
and out-of-sample forecasts for  1996. The difference between predicted 
and actual spreads (in basis points) is presented in table 4.9. When the ob- 
served spread is less than predicted (an entry with a positive sign in table 
4.9), we  infer that the market is growing increasingly exuberant. Actual 
spreads were above predicted spreads and were especially high in late 1995 
and early 1996. This is consistent with the earlier observation that primary 
launch spreads lag the changes in secondary market prices. Following a 
sharp decline in  new  issues as secondary spreads rose,  primary  issues 
started coming back to the market at higher spreads. In the second half 
of  1996, the divergence between actual and predicted spreads narrowed, 
foreshadowing the “irrational exuberance’’ of 1997. 
We next repeated the estimates up to 1996 (as in table 4.7) and generated 
in-sample predictions  for  1996 and out-of-sample predictions for  1997. 
The aggressive fall in spreads is evident for Latin America. Actual spreads 
fall below predicted with the gap increasing up to the third quarter of 
1997. In the final quarter of 1997, the gap falls. With the East Asian crisis 
of the summer of 1997 spreading to Latin America, spreads rose, bringing 
them closer to the predicted spreads. For East Asia, we  see clearly the ef- 
fect of the crisis, with actual spreads rising rapidly above predicted spreads 
in the second half of 1997. 
Table 4.9  The Swings in Market Sentiment 
Predictions Based on 
Sample for 1991-95 
Predictions Based on 
Sample for 199 1-96 
Latin  East  Latin  East 



























-  59 


















-  70 
-  229 
Nore: Values represent differences between predicted and actual spreads in basis points. 130  Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody 
4.7  Conclusions and Implications 
We have studied the determinants of launch spreads on emerging mar- 
ket debt using a framework that accounts for the joint determination of 
the issue and pricing decisions and controls for selectivity. Factors that 
increase the probability of observing an issue and raise the spread we in- 
terpret in terms of the supply of bonds, while those that increase the prob- 
ability of an issue while reducing the spread we interpret in terms of de- 
mand. The results confirm the importance of both blades of the scissors. 
But the results for Latin America and East Asia are different, especially 
toward the beginning of the 1990s. For example, there is evidence that the 
supply of bonds by Latin American issuers is less responsive to changing 
market conditions. There is some sign that the extent of this regional dif- 
ferentiation has narrowed as the market has grown deeper. Other signs of 
a maturing market include the appearance of a well-defined yield curve for 
Latin America, and evidence that borrowers are exploiting scale economies 
when issuing bonds. 
Our most striking finding is that changes in market sentiment not obvi- 
ously related to fundamentals have moved the market by  large amounts 
over short periods. Changes in observable issuer characteristics and in the 
responsiveness of spreads and issues to those characteristics do not pro- 
vide an adequate explanation for changes over time in the value of new 
bond issues and launch spreads. In important periods, such as the wake 
of the Mexican and Asian crises, blanket shifts in sentiment play the domi- 
nant role. 
The obvious implication for policy is that governments should exercise 
caution &hen contemplating an economic policy strategy that relies on 
continuous inflows of foreign capital intermediated by  the international 
bond market.  Large quantities of foreign credit may be available when 
sentiment shifts in their favor, but it can also shift against them for reasons 
beyond  their control, making it impossible to finance large current ac- 
count deficits and forcing a difficult adjustment. There is an argument for 
insuring  against the capriciousness  of  the bond market by  diversifying 
sources of international borrowing to include foreign direct investment, 
equity investment, and syndicated bank loans. And it would be prudent to 
insure against the sudden evaporation of foreign financing and the sudden 
appearance of  a painful adjustment burden by  taking steps to limit the 
size of the current account deficit. 
The first round of empirical work for this paper was done in the first 
half of 1997, a period of large-scale bond issues by emerging market bor- 
rowers and dramatic spread compression. There were but a few voices in 
the wilderness warning that this favorable state of affairs could come to a 
sudden end at any time. In a sense, this was the central prediction of our 
empirical work. It came true in the final quarter of that year. What Explains Changing Spreads on Emerging Market Debt?  131 
Data Appendix 
Bond Characteristics 
The bond data set, obtained from Capital Data Bondware and further 
processed by  the Emerging Markets  Division of  the IMF includes (a) 
spreads (in basis points, where one basis point is one-hundredth of a per- 
centage point) over “risk-free’’ issue denominated in the same currency 
and of about the same maturity; (b) the amount of the issue (millions of 
US$); (c) the maturity in years; (d) a dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
the bond was “privately placed” and 0 otherwise; (e) currency of issue; and 
(f) whether the issuer was a sovereign, a public agency, or a private party. 
Issuer Characteristics 
The following variables were constructed from Bondware. 
S  Sovereign 
P  Private 
0  Other 
LAC  Latin America and Caribbean 
ECA 
AFR  Africa 
SAS  South Asia 
EAP  East Asia and Pacific 

















total external debt (US$) 
gross national product in current prices 
total foreign reserves minus gold 
gross domestic product in 1990 prices and national currency 
gross domestic product at current prices in national currency 
gross domestic product in current prices and denominated in 
US$ 
total budget deficit (national currency) 
indicator variable to denote whether a debt rescheduling took 
place the previous year 
ratio of edt to gnp 
gross domestic product growth 
deficitlgdp 
reserveslgnp 
total external debt serviceltotal exports 
10 yield of ten-years treasury bond 
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Reserves, gdp90, gdpnc, and deficit are reported quarterly in the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics. Where quarterly data were not available, 
annual data were converted to quarterly figures by  multiplying the “log 
difference” by one-fourth. 
The two main sources for these variables were the World Bank’s World 
Debt  Tables (WBDT) and the  International  Monetary  Fund’s Interna- 
tional Financial Statistics (IFS). 
edt  WBDT vol. 2, series called “EDT” 
gnp  WBDT vol. 2, series called “GNP” 
tdsxgs  WBDT vol. 2, series classified under Topic 4, Debt Indicators 
resimf  IMF IFS, series number “1l.d” 
gdp90  IMF  IFS, series number “99b.p” 
gdpnc  IMF IFS, series number “99b” 
deficit  IMF IFS, series number “80” 
dres  WBDT vol.  1: table A3.3  “Multilateral debt  relief agreements 
with official creditor, Jan. 80-Jan.  96,” pp. 66-72  of the 1996 is- 
sue; table A4.4, “Multilateral debt relief agreements with com- 
mercial banks, Jan. 80-Dec.  95,” pp. 78-82  of the 1996 issue 
Credit ratings were obtained from the Bureau  of  Public Debt of the 
Department  of  Treasury, web  address:  http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/ 
of/ofrt 102.htm. 
The exact series are 
Other specific sources included: 
1. For Argentina, Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel, Korea, Singapore, and 
South Africa, data were obtained from IMF country desks. 
2.  Brazil’s deficithati0 was obtained from the Central Bank of Brazil, 
the Brazilian Ministry  of Finance,  and Garantia as reported by  Dorn- 
busch in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1 (1997), 387, table 5. 
3.  For Hong Kong, additional data were obtained from the Quarterly 
Report of  Gross Domestic Product Estimates published by the Census and 
Statistics Department, Hong Kong, August 1997. 
4.  Data for Taiwan were obtained from the December  1996/January 
1997 Balance of  Payments of  Taiwan District, the Republic of  China, pub- 
lished by the Central Bank of China (Taiwan). 
Countries included in the analysis are Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cy- 
prus,  Czechoslovakia,  the  Czech  Republic,  the  Dominican  Republic, 
Ecuador,  Estonia, Guatemala,  Hong Kong, Hungary,  India, Indonesia, 
Israel,  Jamaica,  Kazakhstan,  Latvia,  Lebanon,  Liberia,  Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, 
Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slo- 
vakia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and To- What Explains Changing Spreads on Emerging Market Debt?  133 
bago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Other countries 
included  in  the  analysis  but  not recorded  as having  issued  bonds are 
Ghana, Jordan, Mauritius, Saudi Arabia, and Sri Lanka. 
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Comment  Sylvia Maxfield 
This paper fits into a growing body of  literature exploring the determi- 
nants of capital flows into and from emerging market countries. One of 
the main points  of debate is  over when and to what extent “pull” and 
“push” factors or irrationality operate in the rapidly growing international 
market for developing country bonds. “Pull” refers to investors attracted 
by  the fundamental characteristics of the issuing country. In this case one 
could  assume a  globally  stable appetite  for  emerging market  country 
bonds where demand, prices, and yields for a particular country’s bonds 
depend on investors’ careful evaluation of that country’s past, present, and 
future creditworthiness. “Push” refers to investors turning to the emerging 
market asset class when their risk-free rate falls below a certain threshold. 
Here the price of  bonds depends to a greater extent on the strength of 
demand for the emerging market bond asset class. When global liquidity 
falls and the risk-free rate rises, capital will move more or less indiscrimi- 
nately out of  emerging market bonds. These studies focus varyingly on 
bond prices, balance of payments, trade balances, actual flows as best as 
they can be measured, and other variables. 
What is new in this paper is an effort to explain the likelihood of a new 
issue and Variation in bond yields at the time of new issue launching. This 
emphasis should make the authors’ effort interesting to Wall Street, but is 
perhaps not as exciting as an effort to predict variation in spreads as bonds 
trade in the secondary market. The authors have also assembled a huge 
number  of  observations. The paper is  replete with  interesting findings 
pointing to valuable follow-up work. 
The authors’ model includes a number of  variables standard to Wall 
Street’s own models of  spread behavior. These capture the fundamental 
variables shaping credit worthiness such as the debt service ratio or GDP 
growth. These fundamentals are what is  expected to motivate investors 
who are “pulled” into emerging market investment. U.S. Treasury yields 
are also included to control for changes in the risk-free investment rate 
and the “push” logic. The model explains cross-national variation better 
than change over time and points to some interesting differences between 
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Latin America and Asia. The “pull” logic appears to operate more consis- 
tently in Asia than Latin America. 
For example, the debt service ratio has the expected positive impact on 
spreads in Asia but not Latin America. Investors do not behave as though 
they expect conventional market discipline to operate in Latin America. 
One possible explanation is a belief that the higher the debt burden, the 
more likely an international bailout and the lower the default risk. An- 
other explanation is that irrational exuberance operated to a greater extent 
in Latin America than Asia. Another result is that GDP growth has a 
negative effect on spreads in Asia and positive one in Latin America, sug- 
gesting that investors believe Asians will harness growth to help repay debt 
but Latin Americans might not. Overall these results could be interpreted 
as suggesting that, for the period studied, the market for Asian interna- 
tional bonds behaved more in line with expectations than the Latin Ameri- 
can markets. This should not be surprising given that the period covers 
the Mexican peso crisis. The data on error term correlation suggest that 
unobservables are doing much of the work to explain new issue launch 
spreads in Latin America. 
The authors also use their results to tell a novel story about demand 
and supply in international markets for developing-country bonds. They 
find that as U.S. interest rates rise, new issue launch spreads fall. This 
contravenes the “push” logic that investors buy emerging market assets 
when the risk-free rates falls. Their explanation is that when U.S. rates rise 
only the more credit worthy issuers come to the market. Supply is con- 
stricted and spreads compress. 
This result spggests the need for more nuanced study of the interaction 
of supply and demand for emerging market assets. Wall Street refers to 
these considerations as “technical” factors, while determinants of credit 
worthiness such as debt service ratios are called “fundamentals.” Most 
experienced fixed income traders will tell you that in any relatively illiquid 
market, technicals (supply and demand considerations) are key  to price 
behavior. An interesting extension of Eichengreen and Mody’s research 
would be to separate the sample according to the extent of liquidity. The 
conventional Wall Street wisdom is that technical factors matter more the 
less liquid the market. A related consideration is variation in the size of 
the issue and the issuers’ total outstanding bond stock. Larger issues will 
be more liquid. If diversification is an important investor motive, demand 
could be unexpectedly high and spreads tight for issues from countries 
with few bonds outstanding. 
The results also suggest a different and to me more plausible conclusion 
than the one offered by the authors. This explanation returns to the de- 
mand side and is simply that investor exuberance swamped the rate dif- 
ferential logic throughout the entire period studied. Perhaps the impact of 136  Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody 
the risk-free rate on investors’ behavior corresponds not to simple varia- 
tion in the rate but to accumulated changes in the risk-free rate over time. 
The  authors  might  consider  looking  for  threshold  levels  that  trigger 
changes in demand; this would, however, require longer time series than 
we have available. The authors’ suggestion about supply behavior is strik- 
ing and counterintuitive, but on Wall Street and for issuing country debt 
managers the more interesting question would be whether spreads in the 
secondary market follow the same logic. 
In summary this paper contributes to the debate on determinants of in- 
vestment in foreign currency denominated emerging market bonds. It sug- 
gests that “pull” logic operated more strongly in Asia than Latin America. 
Future research should aim to illuminate whether this happened due to 
cross-regional differences, informational inefficiency, moral hazard, irra- 
tionality, or some other factor. The paper also suggests a need to explore 
the interaction between global liquidity, the risk-free rate, and exuberance. 